Advisory record · GHSA-7j32-2mpw-c784

Ed25519 identity public keys permit universal signature forgery

No CVSS score

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 9 Aug 2026, 12:00 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

PackageEcosystemAffectedFixed in
dcrypt-signcrates.io>=0.0.0-0, <2.0.02.0.0
Identifiers
GHSA-7j32-2mpw-c784 · RUSTSEC-2026-0240
Published
9 Aug 2026
Updated
12 Oct 2026

Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

The dcrypt-sign crate before 2.0.0 accepted the Edwards identity and other noncanonical or small-order values as Ed25519 public keys, so a signature with a chosen R and S = 1 could verify for any message. An attacker who can supply a public key to a consumer that trusts externally supplied dcrypt Ed25519 keys could forge authorizations. Upgrade to dcrypt-sign 2.0.0 or later, and audit registered keys and trust stores; the source does not recommend a wrapper around the affected verifier as a complete workaround.

Written 3 Nov 2026.

Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

Severity and exploitation

No source has published a CVSS score for this record yet.

  • CISA KEV Not listed.
  • EPSS No score.

Timeline

  1. 31 Oct 2026, 14:24 UTC First seen by agentprime
  2. 31 Oct 2026, 14:24 UTC Confirmed by OSV

Sources

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.