# Apache Airflow's Google provider built Google Drive search expressions by interpolating file and folder names directly into single-quoted string literals, without escaping the quote character that ...

Advisory record · `PYSEC-2026-4187`

- **Identifiers:** `PYSEC-2026-4187` · `CVE-2026-81914`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 4.3 Medium
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-943](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/943.html)
- **Tags:** [Other injection](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/injection.md)
- **Published:** 29 Sept 2026
- **Updated:** 8 Oct 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by OSV at 29 Sept 2026, 10:17 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `apache-airflow-providers-google` (PyPI): affected `<22.6.0`; fixed in `22.6.0`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Apache Airflow's apache-airflow-providers-google package, versions before 22.6.0, builds Google Drive search queries by inserting file and folder names into single-quoted strings without escaping apostrophes. An attacker who can create objects in a bucket used by a wildcard gcs_to_gdrive transfer, or otherwise supply names to the Drive hook, can add clauses to the query. This can redirect uploads into an attacker-named folder or make downloads return an attacker-placed file. Upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-google 22.6.0 or later, which escapes these values.

Written 1 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 4.3 Medium, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`, from OSV

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0047, the 40th percentile, on 9 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/PYSEC-2026-4187)

## Sources

- [OSV: PYSEC-2026-4187](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/PYSEC-2026-4187)
- <http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/29/13>
- <https://lists.apache.org/thread/90osv795jrqds051y7v3lcdzhsospooo>
- <https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72166>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/PYSEC-2026-4187>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/PYSEC-2026-4187/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.
