# praisonaiagents has an SSRF protection bypass in \`spider_tools.\_host_is_blocked()\` via DNS-resolved hostnames (\`127.0.0.1.nip.io\`)

Advisory record · `GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74` · `CVE-2026-55526` · `PYSEC-2026-3905`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 8.5 High
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-350](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/350.html) · [CWE-918](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html)
- **Tags:** [Server-side request forgery (SSRF)](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/ssrf.md) · [CWE-350](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/cwe-350.md)
- **Published:** 25 Aug 2026
- **Updated:** 10 Sept 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 25 Aug 2026, 14:37 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `praisonaiagents` (PyPI): affected `<1.6.58`; fixed in `1.6.58`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> The praisonaiagents PyPI package... wait, the rule says don't name the ecosystem unless confusion. Here: praisonaiagents, versions before 1.6.58. The spider_tools \_host_is_blocked() function fails to resolve DNS, so hostnames that resolve to private or loopback addresses (such as 127.0.0.1.nip.io) bypass SSRF protection in scrape_page, extract_links, crawl, and extract_text. An attacker who can get an agent to fetch a user-supplied URL can read responses from internal services, and on cloud hosts this may expose instance credentials. Upgrade to praisonaiagents 1.6.58 or later.

Written 1 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 8.5 High, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0036, the 29th percentile, on 5 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:10 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:10 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74)
- [OSV: GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74)
- <https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74>
- <https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1>
- <https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI>
- <https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.