# phpMyFAQ: /api/setup/backup accessible to any authenticated user (authz missing)

Advisory record · `GHSA-wm8h-26fv-mg7g`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-wm8h-26fv-mg7g` · `CVE-2026-24421` · `PKSA-fgvt-rx8y-b52y` · `PKSA-kw83-ss3b-tqsv`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 6.5 Medium
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-285](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/285.html) · [CWE-862](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html)
- **Tags:** [Broken access control](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/access-control.md)
- **Published:** 23 Jan 2026
- **Updated:** 3 Feb 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 23 Jan 2026, 20:17 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq` (Packagist): affected `<4.0.17`; fixed in `4.0.17`
- `thorsten/phpmyfaq` (Packagist): affected `<4.0.17`; fixed in `4.0.17`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Two packages are affected: phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq and thorsten/phpmyfaq, both before 4.0.17, and both are fixed in 4.0.17. The backup endpoint at /api/setup/backup checks that a user is logged in but not that they are an administrator, so any authenticated non-admin user can trigger a configuration backup and receive a link to the generated ZIP. If that ZIP is web-accessible due to a server misconfiguration, secrets could be exposed. Upgrade to 4.0.17 or later.

Written 3 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 6.5 Medium, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.017, the 78th percentile, on 19 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:26 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:26 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wm8h-26fv-mg7g)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-wm8h-26fv-mg7g](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wm8h-26fv-mg7g)
- [OSV: GHSA-wm8h-26fv-mg7g](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wm8h-26fv-mg7g)
- <https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-wm8h-26fv-mg7g>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24421>
- <https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-wm8h-26fv-mg7g>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-wm8h-26fv-mg7g/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.
