# AdminNeo: CSRF Token Secret Recoverable from Single Observed Token, Enabling Cross-Site Request Forgery

Advisory record · `GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg` · `CVE-2026-96629` · `PKSA-1q5j-gcpm-qr2y`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 6.8 Medium
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-330](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/330.html) · [CWE-352](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/352.html)
- **Tags:** [Weak cryptography or TLS](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/weak-crypto.md) · [Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/csrf.md)
- **Published:** 30 Oct 2026
- **Updated:** 30 Oct 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 30 Oct 2026, 22:51 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `adminneo-org/adminneo` (Packagist): affected `<5.5.1`; fixed in `5.5.1`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> AdminNeo versions before 5.5.1 have a CSRF protection weakness: each token carries both the XOR mask and the masked value, so anyone who sees a single token can recover the session secret and forge valid tokens. The source describes observation routes such as referrer leaks, logs, network sniffing, or XSS, and also says the session token has low entropy that could allow brute force. An attacker who can forge tokens can perform state-changing requests as a logged-in user, including SQL actions through AdminNeo. The fix is to upgrade to version 5.5.1.

Written 31 Oct 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 6.8 Medium, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`, from GitHub Advisory Database

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** No score.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 13:53 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 13:53 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg)
- [OSV: GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg)
- <https://github.com/adminneo-org/adminneo/security/advisories/GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg>
- <https://github.com/adminneo-org/adminneo/commit/f575eee5e35eacd6c55a9912648e9e8fe24a9f44>
- <https://github.com/adminneo-org/adminneo>
- <https://github.com/adminneo-org/adminneo/releases/tag/v5.5.1>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.
