# IncusOS has a LUKS encryption bypass due to insufficient TPM policy

Advisory record · `GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc` · `CVE-2026-32606` · `GO-2026-4704`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 7.7 High
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-522](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/522.html)
- **Tags:** [Hard-coded credentials](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/hard-coded-credentials.md)
- **Published:** 16 Mar 2026
- **Updated:** 26 Mar 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 16 Mar 2026, 16:26 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `github.com/lxc/incus-os/incus-osd` (Go): affected `<0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23`; fixed in `0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> The IncusOS package github.com/lxc/incus-os/incus-osd is affected in versions before 0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23, and that version is the fix. An attacker with physical access can swap the encrypted root partition for one they control, have a boot-time unit extract the LUKS volume key from the real disk through the TPM, and then access or modify the original data. Upgrade to 0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23 or later; no workarounds are listed.

Written 7 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 7.7 High, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0015, the 4th percentile, on 13 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 15:08 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 15:08 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc)
- [OSV: GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc)
- <https://github.com/lxc/incus-os/security/advisories/GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32606>
- <https://github.com/lxc/incus-os/pull/954>
- <https://github.com/lxc/incus-os/commit/e3b35f230d23443d27752eac27ebb2b22c957b75>
- <https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/potential-luks-encryption-bypass-through-filesystem-confusion/26348>
- <https://github.com/lxc/incus-os>
- <https://oddlama.org/blog/bypassing-disk-encryption-with-tpm2-unlock>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.