# Crossplane: Signature verification TOCTOU allows installing unverified package content via mutable tag

Advisory record · `GHSA-wfqx-gjrf-g28r`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-wfqx-gjrf-g28r` · `GO-2026-5709`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 9.0 Critical
- **Critical:** Yes: CVSS 9+
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-345](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/345.html) · [CWE-367](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html)
- **Tags:** [Race condition](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/race-condition.md) · [CWE-345](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/cwe-345.md)
- **Published:** 19 Jun 2026
- **Updated:** 29 Sept 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 19 Jun 2026, 20:47 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Critical

Critical, because:

- CVSS score 9.0: 9.0 or more.

How we decide what’s critical: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/critical.md>

## Affected packages

- `github.com/crossplane/crossplane/v2` (Go): affected `>=2.3.0-rc.0, <2.3.3 || <2.2.3`; fixed in `2.3.3`, `2.2.3`
- `github.com/crossplane/crossplane` (Go): affected `<=1.21.0-rc.0`; no fixed version yet

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Crossplane v2 versions before 2.2.3 and from 2.3.0-rc.0 before 2.3.3 are affected, as are Crossplane v1 releases up to and including 1.21.0-rc.0, for which no fixed version is listed. When signature verification is enabled and packages are installed by tag from a registry the user does not control, an attacker-controlled registry can serve a signed image for verification and an unsigned one for installation, so unverified content gets installed. Upgrade v2 installs to 2.2.3 or 2.3.3. Installing packages by image digest instead of tags avoids the issue.

Written 1 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 9.0 Critical, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`, from GitHub Advisory Database

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** No score.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:12 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:12 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wfqx-gjrf-g28r)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-wfqx-gjrf-g28r](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wfqx-gjrf-g28r)
- [OSV: GHSA-wfqx-gjrf-g28r](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wfqx-gjrf-g28r)
- <https://github.com/crossplane/crossplane/security/advisories/GHSA-wfqx-gjrf-g28r>
- <https://github.com/crossplane/crossplane>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-wfqx-gjrf-g28r>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-wfqx-gjrf-g28r/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.