# Glances Central Browser Autodiscovery Leaks Reusable Credentials to Zeroconf-Spoofed Servers

Advisory record · `GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm` · `CVE-2026-32634` · `PYSEC-2026-2172`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 8.1 High
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-346](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/346.html) · [CWE-522](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/522.html)
- **Tags:** [Hard-coded credentials](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/hard-coded-credentials.md) · [CWE-346](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/cwe-346.md)
- **Published:** 16 Mar 2026
- **Updated:** 13 Jul 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 16 Mar 2026, 16:36 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `glances` (PyPI): affected `<4.5.2`; fixed in `4.5.2`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Glances versions before 4.5.2 are affected in Central Browser mode with Zeroconf autodiscovery enabled. An attacker on the same local network can advertise a fake Glances service, causing the browser to send a reusable Glances authentication secret (a hashed saved or default password) to an attacker-controlled host without user interaction. Upgrade glances to version 4.5.2 or later. Avoid saving passwords, including the default password, for autodiscovered servers in Central Browser mode until the upgrade is applied.

Written 6 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 8.1 High, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0028, the 20th percentile, on 11 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 15:04 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 15:04 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm)
- [OSV: GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm)
- <https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32634>
- <https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/61d38eec521703e41e4933d18d5a5ef6f854abd5>
- <https://github.com/nicolargo/glances>
- <https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.