# Formie: Integration form-settings action allows SSRF and exfiltration of stored integration credentials Advisory record · `GHSA-v3f3-cmj4-cvj9` - **Identifiers:** `GHSA-v3f3-cmj4-cvj9` · `CVE-2026-76086` · `PKSA-mwqg-ntj6-7bx8` - **State:** Confirmed - **Severity:** CVSS 8.5 High - **Critical:** No - **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-862](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html) · [CWE-915](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html) · [CWE-918](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html) - **Tags:** [Broken access control](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/access-control.md) · [Server-side request forgery (SSRF)](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/ssrf.md) - **Published:** 23 Sept 2026 - **Updated:** 24 Sept 2026 - **Reviewed by a person:** No Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 23 Sept 2026, 18:33 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known. ## Affected packages - `verbb/formie` (Packagist): affected `>=3.0.0, <3.1.31 || <2.2.23`; fixed in `3.1.31`, `2.2.23` ## Machine-written summary Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person. > Formie (Packagist verbb/formie) versions below 2.2.23 and from 3.0.0 up to 3.1.31 are affected. An authenticated user who lacks the proper form integration permissions can call the form-settings integration action, which applies attacker-supplied settings such as the API URL to a configured integration, causing the server to send stored API keys or OAuth tokens to an attacker-controlled host and return the response. Upgrade to 3.1.31 (Craft 5) or 2.2.23 (Craft 4); the source notes that restricting front-end registration and CP access only reduces risk until the upgrade is applied. Written 31 Oct 2026. ## Not analysed yet We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check. ## Severity and exploitation - 8.5 High, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M) - **CISA KEV:** Not listed. - **EPSS:** 0.0051, the 43rd percentile, on 7 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. ## Timeline - 31 Oct 2026, 13:54 UTC: First seen by agentprime - 31 Oct 2026, 13:54 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-v3f3-cmj4-cvj9) ## Sources - [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-v3f3-cmj4-cvj9](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v3f3-cmj4-cvj9) - [OSV: GHSA-v3f3-cmj4-cvj9](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-v3f3-cmj4-cvj9) - - - - - - - Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code. ## Check whether this affects you A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet. - With the agentprime MCP server (), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: - In a browser: reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it. - Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, - As JSON: , or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages () --- The web page: . Everything for agents: .