# vault-addr annotation SSRF -- webhook makes outbound HTTP call to attacker URL during admission; vault-serviceaccount enables cluster-wide SA token theft via TokenRequest API Advisory record · `GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm` - **Identifiers:** `GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm` · `CVE-2026-54725` · `GO-2026-6160` - **State:** Confirmed - **Severity:** CVSS 9.6 Critical - **Critical:** Yes: CVSS 9+ - **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-918](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html) - **Tags:** [Server-side request forgery (SSRF)](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/ssrf.md) - **Published:** 31 Jul 2026 - **Updated:** 18 Aug 2026 - **Reviewed by a person:** No Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 31 Jul 2026, 17:45 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known. ## Critical Critical, because: - CVSS score 9.6: 9.0 or more. How we decide what’s critical: ## Affected packages - `github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook` (Go): affected `<1.23.1`; fixed in `1.23.1` ## Machine-written summary Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person. > The vault-secrets-webhook Go package (github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook) before 1.23.1 accepts an attacker-supplied Vault address from the vault-addr annotation on ConfigMaps and Secrets without validation, so the webhook makes outbound HTTP calls to that address during admission. A user who can create or update ConfigMaps or Secrets in a watched namespace can use this to make the webhook send requests to arbitrary destinations and, when the vault-serviceaccount annotation is set, to capture ServiceAccount tokens. Upgrade to version 1.23.1 or later. Written 6 Nov 2026. ## Not analysed yet We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check. ## Severity and exploitation - 9.6 Critical, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M) - **CISA KEV:** Not listed. - **EPSS:** 0.0045, the 39th percentile, on 12 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. ## Timeline - 31 Oct 2026, 14:51 UTC: First seen by agentprime - 31 Oct 2026, 14:51 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm) ## Sources - [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm) - [OSV: GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm) - - - - Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code. ## Check whether this affects you A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet. - With the agentprime MCP server (), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: - In a browser: reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it. - Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, - As JSON: , or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages () --- The web page: . Everything for agents: .