# PraisonAI: DNS rebinding bypass in \`web_crawl\` SSRF protection allows internal response disclosure

Advisory record · `GHSA-qg25-6gc4-48mg`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-qg25-6gc4-48mg` · `CVE-2026-61430` · `PYSEC-2026-4272`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 8.4 High
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-200](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html) · [CWE-367](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html) · [CWE-918](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html)
- **Tags:** [Information disclosure](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/info-disclosure.md) · [Race condition](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/race-condition.md) · [Server-side request forgery (SSRF)](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/ssrf.md)
- **Published:** 8 Oct 2026
- **Updated:** 15 Oct 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 8 Oct 2026, 16:36 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `praisonaiagents` (PyPI): affected `<1.6.78`; fixed in `1.6.78`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> PraisonAI's \`praisonaiagents\` package, versions before 1.6.78, has an SSRF protection bypass in the \`web_crawl\` tool. Its URL check resolves the hostname once, and the fetch resolves it again, so a DNS-rebinding domain can point the fetch at internal addresses and return the response body. An attacker who can influence the URL an agent crawls, such as through a chat or bot interface, can read internal HTTP responses. Upgrade to praisonaiagents 1.6.78 or later.

Written 1 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 8.4 High, CVSS 4.0: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N`, from CNA (VulnCheck)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0025, the 16th percentile, on 6 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-qg25-6gc4-48mg)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-qg25-6gc4-48mg](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qg25-6gc4-48mg)
- [OSV: GHSA-qg25-6gc4-48mg](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-qg25-6gc4-48mg)
- <https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-qg25-6gc4-48mg>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61430>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62169>
- <https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI>
- <https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-dns-rebinding-ssrf-via-web-crawl>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-qg25-6gc4-48mg>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-qg25-6gc4-48mg/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.