# biscuit-auth vulnerable to public key confusion in third party block

Advisory record · `GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7` · `CVE-2024-41949` · `CVE-2024-42350` · `GHSA-47cq-pc2v-3rmp` · `GHSA-rgqv-mwc3-c78m` · `HSEC-2024-0009`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 3.0 Low
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-269](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/269.html) · [CWE-668](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/668.html)
- **Tags:** [Privilege escalation](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/privilege-escalation.md) · [Information disclosure](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/info-disclosure.md)
- **Published:** 31 Jul 2024
- **Updated:** 15 Oct 2025
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 31 Jul 2024, 21:15 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `biscuit-auth` (crates.io): affected `>=4.0.0, <5.0.0`; fixed in `5.0.0`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Versions 4.0.0 up to but not including 5.0.0 of biscuit-auth are affected. An attacker who holds a token can forge a third-party block request that alters the public key list in the symbol table, so a third-party authority signs a block that trusts a different keypair than intended. This lets the attacker use the token without a valid block from the intended authority. The source gives few details on exact conditions. Upgrade to biscuit-auth 5.0.0 or later; no workaround is listed.

Written 8 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 3.0 Low, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0029, the 21st percentile, on 17 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7)
- [OSV: GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7)
- <https://github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-rust/security/advisories/GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7>
- <https://github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit/security/advisories/GHSA-rgqv-mwc3-c78m>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41949>
- <https://github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-rust>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.
