# Apache Storm's Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leads to Anonymous Principal Assignment

Advisory record · `GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh` · `CVE-2026-41081`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 6.5 Medium
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-287](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html)
- **Tags:** [Authentication bypass](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/auth-bypass.md)
- **Published:** 27 Apr 2026
- **Updated:** 5 May 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 27 Apr 2026, 15:30 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `org.apache.storm:storm-client` (Maven): affected `<2.8.7`; fixed in `2.8.7`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Apache Storm storm-client versions up to 2.8.7 are affected. When TLS is enabled without requiring client certificates (the default), a client that presents no certificate or fails certificate verification is silently assigned the principal CN=ANONYMOUS instead of being rejected. An unauthenticated client can then reach Storm services, and may bypass authorization if the configured authorizer does not explicitly deny that principal. Upgrade to 2.8.7, or enable mandatory client certificate authentication and explicitly deny CN=ANONYMOUS in authorization rules.

Written 3 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 6.5 Medium, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N`, from GitHub Advisory Database

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0029, the 21st percentile, on 11 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:20 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:20 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh)
- [OSV: GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh)
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41081>
- <https://github.com/apache/storm>
- <https://lists.apache.org/thread/plxx5l29dvplk5rwzdcq53rdfl6v4gs8>
- <http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/25/3>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.