# FacturaScripts: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() via getClientOriginalName() — arbitrary file write outside MyFiles/ leading to RCE

Advisory record · `GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4` · `CVE-2026-77526` · `PKSA-ckhc-1b7w-fbqb`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 9.9 Critical
- **Critical:** Yes: CVSS 9+
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-22](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html) · [CWE-434](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html)
- **Tags:** [Path traversal](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/path-traversal.md) · [Unrestricted file upload](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/file-upload.md)
- **Published:** 14 Jul 2026
- **Updated:** 2 Nov 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 14 Jul 2026, 20:52 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Critical

Critical, because:

- CVSS score 9.9: 9.0 or more.

How we decide what’s critical: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/critical.md>

## Affected packages

- `facturascripts/facturascripts` (Packagist): affected `>=2025, <2026.3`; fixed in `2026.3`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> FacturaScripts versions from 2025 before 2026.3 do not sanitize uploaded file names, so an authenticated user with upload permission can write files outside the MyFiles/ directory. The source describes chaining this to remote code execution as the web server user. Upgrade to FacturaScripts 2026.3, which fixes the issue.

Written 3 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 9.9 Critical, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`, from GitHub Advisory Database

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** No score.

## Timeline

- 14 Jul 2026, 20:52 UTC: [Confirmed by Packagist](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4)
- 14 Jul 2026, 20:52 UTC: [Confirmed by GitHub Advisory Database](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4)
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:25 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:25 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4)
- [OSV: GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4)
- <https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts/security/advisories/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4>
- <https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.