# TSPortal: Any user can forge self-deletion requests for any account

Advisory record · `GHSA-gfhq-7499-f3f2`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-gfhq-7499-f3f2` · `CVE-2026-29788` · `PKSA-95py-dkb3-3t1y`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 8.4 High
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-283](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/283.html) · [CWE-1287](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1287.html)
- **Tags:** [CWE-283](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/cwe-283.md) · [CWE-1287](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/cwe-1287.md)
- **Published:** 27 Mar 2026
- **Updated:** 9 Apr 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 27 Mar 2026, 15:37 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `miraheze/ts-portal` (Packagist): affected `<30`; fixed in `30`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Miraheze's ts-portal package, versions before 30, is vulnerable. Any user who can file a DPA report can leave the evidence field empty, and because empty strings are converted to null, the report appears to be a genuine self-deletion request from the reported user, which could lead to unauthorized deletion of that user's data. Upgrade to version 30 or later. Alternatively, require a non-empty evidence field in the DPA report form.

Written 3 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 8.4 High, CVSS 4.0: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:L/SA:H`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0029, the 22nd percentile, on 5 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:25 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:25 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-gfhq-7499-f3f2)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-gfhq-7499-f3f2](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gfhq-7499-f3f2)
- [OSV: GHSA-gfhq-7499-f3f2](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-gfhq-7499-f3f2)
- <https://github.com/miraheze/TSPortal/security/advisories/GHSA-gfhq-7499-f3f2>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29788>
- <https://api.laravel.com/docs/12.x/Illuminate/Foundation/Configuration/Middleware.html#method_convertEmptyStringsToNull>
- <https://github.com/miraheze/TSPortal>
- <https://issue-tracker.miraheze.org/T15053>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-gfhq-7499-f3f2>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-gfhq-7499-f3f2/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.