# In the AWS Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store secrets backends of \`apache-airflow-providers-amazon\` prior to 9.28.0, the team-scoping logic could resolve a \`conn_id\` containing a \`/\` (e.g. \`"m...

Advisory record · `GHSA-g9qc-qf28-hhqx`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-g9qc-qf28-hhqx` · `CVE-2026-42526` · `PYSEC-2026-595`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 5.3 Medium
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-863](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/863.html)
- **Tags:** [Broken access control](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/access-control.md)
- **Published:** 19 May 2026
- **Updated:** 13 Jul 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 19 May 2026, 20:16 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `apache-airflow-providers-amazon` (PyPI): affected `<9.28.0`; fixed in `9.28.0`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> The apache-airflow-providers-amazon package before 9.28.0 has a flaw in the AWS Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store secrets backends. With the experimental multi-tenant teams feature, a connection ID containing a slash could resolve to another team's secret path when the caller has no team context. A privileged caller could use this to read another team's secret. Upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-amazon 9.28.0, which fixes the issue.

Written 5 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 5.3 Medium, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`, from OSV

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0041, the 36th percentile, on 18 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:43 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:43 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/PYSEC-2026-595)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-g9qc-qf28-hhqx](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g9qc-qf28-hhqx)
- [OSV: GHSA-g9qc-qf28-hhqx](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-g9qc-qf28-hhqx)
- <http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/19/36>
- <https://lists.apache.org/thread/0092sz5g520d3qqjb01wd61myqlgjtyn>
- <https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/65703>
- <https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g9qc-qf28-hhqx>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-g9qc-qf28-hhqx>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-g9qc-qf28-hhqx/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.
