# TSDProxy: Internal proxy auth token forwarded to backend services enables management API escalation

Advisory record · `GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8` · `GO-2026-5969`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 9.0 Critical
- **Critical:** Yes: CVSS 9+
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-200](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html) · [CWE-287](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html)
- **Tags:** [Information disclosure](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/info-disclosure.md) · [Authentication bypass](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/auth-bypass.md)
- **Published:** 10 Jul 2026
- **Updated:** 21 Jul 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 10 Jul 2026, 21:43 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Critical

Critical, because:

- CVSS score 9.0: 9.0 or more.

How we decide what’s critical: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/critical.md>

## Affected packages

- `github.com/almeidapaulopt/tsdproxy` (Go): affected `<1.4.4-0.20260603142855-434819b4421e`; fixed in `1.4.4-0.20260603142855-434819b4421e`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> TSDProxy versions before 1.4.4-0.20260603142855-434819b4421e forward the internal per-process authentication token to proxied backend services when identityHeaders is enabled, which is the default. A backend that can reach the management port on localhost can use that token with a spoofed identity header to bypass Tailscale authentication, which would let an attacker with code execution in a backend restart or pause proxied services, read proxy configurations, and trigger webhook requests. Upgrade to 1.4.4-0.20260603142855-434819b4421e or later.

Written 6 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 9.0 Critical, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`, from GitHub Advisory Database

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** No score.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:58 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:58 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8)
- [OSV: GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8)
- <https://github.com/almeidapaulopt/tsdproxy/security/advisories/GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8>
- <https://github.com/almeidapaulopt/tsdproxy>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.
