# The Apache Airflow FTP provider's \`FTPSHook.get_conn()\` created an \`ftplib.FTP_TLS\` connection but never called \`prot_p()\`, so although the control channel was TLS-protected the data channel was tr...

Advisory record · `GHSA-fgch-86x8-fv43`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-fgch-86x8-fv43` · `CVE-2026-49486` · `PYSEC-2026-238`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 7.5 High
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-319](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/319.html)
- **Tags:** [Weak cryptography or TLS](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/weak-crypto.md)
- **Published:** 26 Jun 2026
- **Updated:** 10 Sept 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 26 Jun 2026, 08:16 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `apache-airflow-providers-ftp` (PyPI): affected `<3.15.1`; fixed in `3.15.1`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> The apache-airflow-providers-ftp package, affected versions before 3.15.1, left the FTPS data channel unencrypted in FTPSHook.get_conn(), even though the control channel used TLS. An attacker able to observe network traffic between Airflow and the FTPS server could read transferred file contents. Upgrade apache-airflow-providers-ftp to 3.15.1 or later, which encrypts the data channel.

Written 1 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 7.5 High, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`, from OSV

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0044, the 38th percentile, on 11 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:10 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:10 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/PYSEC-2026-238)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-fgch-86x8-fv43](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fgch-86x8-fv43)
- [OSV: GHSA-fgch-86x8-fv43](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fgch-86x8-fv43)
- <http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/26/1>
- <https://lists.apache.org/thread/gwnsxlt9hfj5pc543wxtogbnjdn04xj1>
- <https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/67946>
- <https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fgch-86x8-fv43>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-fgch-86x8-fv43>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-fgch-86x8-fv43/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.