# Pingora vulnerable to cache poisoning via insecure-by-default cache key

Advisory record · `GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc` · `CVE-2026-2836` · `RUSTSEC-2026-0035`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 8.4 High
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-345](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/345.html) · [CWE-639](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html)
- **Tags:** [Broken access control](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/access-control.md) · [CWE-345](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/cwe-345.md)
- **Published:** 5 Mar 2026
- **Updated:** 9 Mar 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 5 Mar 2026, 20:57 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `pingora-cache` (crates.io): affected `<0.8.0`; fixed in `0.8.0`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Pingora (crates.io package pingora-cache) versions prior to 0.8.0 build cache keys from the URI path alone, leaving out factors such as the host header. An attacker can poison shared cache entries to serve cross-origin responses, which may leak data across tenants or deliver malicious content to other users, when the default CacheKey implementation is used. Upgrade to pingora-cache 0.8.0 or later, which removes the default implementation; if upgrading is not possible, build the CacheKey with at least the host and the upstream TLS scheme.

Written 8 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 8.4 High, CVSS 4.0: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N`, from CNA (cloudflare)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0040, the 34th percentile, on 11 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc)
- [OSV: GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc)
- <https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/security/advisories/GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2836>
- <https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora>
- <https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0035.html>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.