# OpenAM Arbitrary OAuth Token Minting via Push Registration

Advisory record · `GHSA-cj8f-2fhf-826r`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-cj8f-2fhf-826r` · `CVE-2026-46498`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 7.6 High
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-639](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html)
- **Tags:** [Broken access control](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/access-control.md)
- **Published:** 25 Jun 2026
- **Updated:** 28 Oct 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 25 Jun 2026, 17:07 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-oauth2` (Maven): affected `<16.1.1`; fixed in `16.1.1`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> OpenAM's openam-oauth2 Maven package, versions before 16.1.1, has an authorization bypass in its stateful OAuth2 token-read path, where caller-supplied identifiers are read from the shared Core Token Store without checking the token type. An attacker who can place attacker-controlled data into the token store under an identifier they know, such as through a Push Notification callback in a Push-enabled realm, can forge OAuth2 bearer and OIDC ID tokens with chosen subject, client, realm, and scope. Upgrade to version 16.1.1.

Written 2 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 7.6 High, CVSS 4.0: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0041, the 35th percentile, on 9 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:16 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:16 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-cj8f-2fhf-826r)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-cj8f-2fhf-826r](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cj8f-2fhf-826r)
- [OSV: GHSA-cj8f-2fhf-826r](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-cj8f-2fhf-826r)
- <https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/security/advisories/GHSA-cj8f-2fhf-826r>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46498>
- <https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/commit/e047b01f24ce5006dbd62b3084b17df2d7835763>
- <https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM>
- <https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/releases/tag/16.1.1>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-cj8f-2fhf-826r>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-cj8f-2fhf-826r/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.