# Dask Distributed is Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Jupyter Proxy and Dashboard

Advisory record · `GHSA-c336-7962-wfj2`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-c336-7962-wfj2` · `CVE-2026-23528` · `PYSEC-2026-169`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 5.3 Medium
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-79](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html) · [CWE-80](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/80.html) · [CWE-250](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/250.html)
- **Tags:** [Cross-site scripting (XSS)](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/xss.md) · [Privilege escalation](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/privilege-escalation.md)
- **Published:** 16 Jan 2026
- **Updated:** 10 Sept 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 16 Jan 2026, 16:58 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `distributed` (PyPI): affected `<2026.1.0`; fixed in `2026.1.0`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Dask distributed versions before 2026.1.0 are vulnerable to cross-site scripting in the Dask dashboard. An attacker can craft a phishing URL, and if a user running Jupyter Lab with jupyter-server-proxy and a Dask cluster on default ports clicks it, code can run through the default Jupyter Python kernel. Upgrade to distributed 2026.1.0 or later; the source lists no workaround that removes the risk, but uninstalling jupyter-server-proxy or changing default ports reduces exposure.

Written 1 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 5.3 Medium, CVSS 4.0: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0024, the 14th percentile, on 15 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:11 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:11 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-c336-7962-wfj2)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-c336-7962-wfj2](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c336-7962-wfj2)
- [OSV: GHSA-c336-7962-wfj2](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-c336-7962-wfj2)
- <https://github.com/dask/distributed/security/advisories/GHSA-c336-7962-wfj2>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23528>
- <https://github.com/dask/distributed/commit/ab72092a8a938923c2bb51a2cd14ca26614827fa>
- <https://github.com/dask/distributed>
- <https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/distributed/PYSEC-2026-169.yaml>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-c336-7962-wfj2>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-c336-7962-wfj2/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.
