# Mantis Bug Tracker (MantisBT) allows user account takeover in the signup/reset password process

Advisory record · `GHSA-93x3-m7pw-ppqm`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-93x3-m7pw-ppqm` · `CVE-2024-34077` · `PKSA-vn99-1c14-x82z`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 7.3 High
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-305](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/305.html) · [CWE-620](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/620.html)
- **Tags:** [CWE-305](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/cwe-305.md) · [CWE-620](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/cwe-620.md)
- **Published:** 13 May 2024
- **Updated:** 10 Sept 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 13 May 2024, 14:57 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `mantisbt/mantisbt` (Packagist): affected `<2.26.2`; fixed in `2.26.2`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Mantis Bug Tracker (MantisBT) versions before 2.26.2 from the Packagist package mantisbt/mantisbt have an insufficient access control flaw in the registration and password reset process. An attacker who can make brute-force requests to account_update.php while a victim's incomplete signup or reset request is pending may be able to reset that user's password and take over the account, which would give full access to it. The fix is to upgrade to version 2.26.2; the source also suggests reducing the verification token's validity by changing TOKEN_EXPIRY_AUTHENTICATED as a workaround.

Written 31 Oct 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 7.3 High, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.012, the 68th percentile, on 6 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-93x3-m7pw-ppqm)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-93x3-m7pw-ppqm](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-93x3-m7pw-ppqm)
- [OSV: GHSA-93x3-m7pw-ppqm](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-93x3-m7pw-ppqm)
- <https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/security/advisories/GHSA-93x3-m7pw-ppqm>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34077>
- <https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/92d11a01b195a1b6717a2f205218089158ea6d00>
- <https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt>
- <https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=34433>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-93x3-m7pw-ppqm>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-93x3-m7pw-ppqm/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.
