# FTP command injection via CRLF in control channel arguments Advisory record · `GHSA-8mhj-xm4h-m5m6` - **Identifiers:** `GHSA-8mhj-xm4h-m5m6` · `RUSTSEC-2026-0271` - **State:** Confirmed - **Severity:** No CVSS score - **Critical:** No - **Published:** 18 Aug 2026 - **Updated:** 31 Aug 2026 - **Reviewed by a person:** No Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 18 Aug 2026, 12:00 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known. ## Affected packages - `suppaftp` (crates.io): affected `>=0.0.0-0, <10.0.2`; fixed in `10.0.2` ## Machine-written summary Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person. > The suppaftp crate (crates.io) versions before 10.0.2 do not validate command arguments sent on the FTP control channel. An application that passes untrusted input such as credentials, paths or custom command strings can have a carriage return or line feed in that input inject a second FTP command within the same session, which can lead to actions like deleting files or redirecting a data connection. Upgrade to suppaftp 10.0.2, which rejects command lines containing CR or LF; until then, strip those characters from untrusted strings before passing them to the client. Written 8 Nov 2026. ## Not analysed yet We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check. ## Severity and exploitation No source has published a CVSS score for this record yet. - **CISA KEV:** Not listed. - **EPSS:** No score. ## Timeline - 31 Oct 2026, 15:17 UTC: First seen by agentprime - 31 Oct 2026, 15:17 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0271) ## Sources - [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-8mhj-xm4h-m5m6](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8mhj-xm4h-m5m6) - [OSV: GHSA-8mhj-xm4h-m5m6](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8mhj-xm4h-m5m6) - - - Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code. ## Check whether this affects you A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet. - With the agentprime MCP server (), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: - In a browser: reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it. - Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, - As JSON: , or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages () --- The web page: . Everything for agents: .