# Laravel Backpack CRUD: SingleBase64Image accepts any base64 payload behind a \`data:image\` prefix — SVG-with-script lands on the public disk

Advisory record · `GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg` · `CVE-2026-54179` · `PKSA-gr8y-xsj7-jw48`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 4.4 Medium
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-79](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html) · [CWE-434](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html)
- **Tags:** [Cross-site scripting (XSS)](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/xss.md) · [Unrestricted file upload](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/file-upload.md)
- **Published:** 20 Aug 2026
- **Updated:** 20 Aug 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 20 Aug 2026, 18:38 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `backpack/crud` (Packagist): affected `>=6.0.0, <6.8.14 || >=7.0.0, <7.0.38`; fixed in `6.8.14`, `7.0.38`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Backpack CRUD (backpack/crud) versions 6.0.0 to before 6.8.14 and 7.0.0 to before 7.0.38 are affected. The image upload field accepts any base64 payload that begins with "data:image" without checking the MIME type or the decoded file bytes, so an authenticated admin can store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk, possibly leading to stored XSS when the file is served. Upgrade to 6.8.14 or 7.0.38. Setting X-Content-Type-Options to nosniff on admin responses is an additional defense.

Written 3 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 4.4 Medium, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0026, the 17th percentile, on 8 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:24 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:24 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg)
- [OSV: GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg)
- <https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/security/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg>
- <https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD>
- <https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/6.8.14>
- <https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/7.0.38>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

---

The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.
