# Easy!Appointments: Authorization bypass in Google OAuth provider binding lets any backend user rebind a peer provider's Google sync

Advisory record · `GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr` · `CVE-2026-52841` · `PKSA-4qd5-bb9g-9x8d`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 3.1 Low
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-639](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html)
- **Tags:** [Broken access control](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/access-control.md)
- **Published:** 29 Jul 2026
- **Updated:** 10 Nov 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 29 Jul 2026, 16:29 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `alextselegidis/easyappointments` (Packagist): affected `<1.6.1`; fixed in `1.6.1`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Easy!Appointments versions up to and including 1.5.2 have an authorization bypass in the Google Calendar OAuth flow. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) can bind a different provider's Google sync to their own Google account, so that provider's appointments and customer names and emails are pushed into the attacker's calendar. No fixed version is listed.

Written 3 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 3.1 Low, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0021, the 10th percentile, on 18 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 29 Jul 2026, 16:29 UTC: [Confirmed by GitHub Advisory Database](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr)
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:24 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:24 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr)
- [OSV: GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr)
- <https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/security/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52841>
- <https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/4b2d245d2cd2058dc76e05f6eb65b26699268471>
- <https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments>
- <https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/releases/tag/1.6.0>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

---

The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.
