# Ed25519 identity public keys permit universal signature forgery Advisory record · `GHSA-7j32-2mpw-c784` - **Identifiers:** `GHSA-7j32-2mpw-c784` · `RUSTSEC-2026-0240` - **State:** Confirmed - **Severity:** No CVSS score - **Critical:** No - **Published:** 9 Aug 2026 - **Updated:** 12 Oct 2026 - **Reviewed by a person:** No Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 9 Aug 2026, 12:00 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known. ## Affected packages - `dcrypt-sign` (crates.io): affected `>=0.0.0-0, <2.0.0`; fixed in `2.0.0` ## Machine-written summary Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person. > The dcrypt-sign crate before 2.0.0 accepted the Edwards identity and other noncanonical or small-order values as Ed25519 public keys, so a signature with a chosen R and S = 1 could verify for any message. An attacker who can supply a public key to a consumer that trusts externally supplied dcrypt Ed25519 keys could forge authorizations. Upgrade to dcrypt-sign 2.0.0 or later, and audit registered keys and trust stores; the source does not recommend a wrapper around the affected verifier as a complete workaround. Written 3 Nov 2026. ## Not analysed yet We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check. ## Severity and exploitation No source has published a CVSS score for this record yet. - **CISA KEV:** Not listed. - **EPSS:** No score. ## Timeline - 31 Oct 2026, 14:24 UTC: First seen by agentprime - 31 Oct 2026, 14:24 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0240) ## Sources - [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-7j32-2mpw-c784](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7j32-2mpw-c784) - [OSV: GHSA-7j32-2mpw-c784](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-7j32-2mpw-c784) - - - - - Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code. ## Check whether this affects you A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet. - With the agentprime MCP server (), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: - In a browser: reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it. - Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, - As JSON: , or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages () --- The web page: . Everything for agents: .