# LibreNMS: SSRF-driven stored XSS via Oxidized API response fields in device showconfig page

Advisory record · `GHSA-7gww-x7fh-jf9j`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-7gww-x7fh-jf9j` · `CVE-2026-84189` · `PKSA-9d1b-7dzj-kkfs`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 9.2 Critical
- **Critical:** Yes: CVSS 9+
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-79](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html) · [CWE-918](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html)
- **Tags:** [Cross-site scripting (XSS)](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/xss.md) · [Server-side request forgery (SSRF)](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/ssrf.md)
- **Published:** 18 Aug 2026
- **Updated:** 2 Sept 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 18 Aug 2026, 21:17 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Critical

Critical, because:

- CVSS score 9.2: 9.0 or more.

How we decide what’s critical: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/critical.md>

## Affected packages

- `librenms/librenms` (Packagist): affected `<26.7.0`; fixed in `26.7.0`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> LibreNMS versions before 26.7.0 (Packagist librenms/librenms) render JSON fields returned by the configured Oxidized integration URL into the device showconfig page without HTML escaping, enabling stored cross-site scripting. An attacker needs admin access to set the Oxidized URL to a server they control, after which any user who views a device's showconfig tab can have script run in their browser. Upgrade to LibreNMS 26.7.0 or later, which the source lists as the fixed version.

Written 31 Oct 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 9.2 Critical, CVSS 4.0: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N`, from CNA (VulnCheck)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0038, the 32nd percentile, on 12 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:06 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:06 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-7gww-x7fh-jf9j)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-7gww-x7fh-jf9j](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7gww-x7fh-jf9j)
- [OSV: GHSA-7gww-x7fh-jf9j](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-7gww-x7fh-jf9j)
- <https://github.com/librenms/librenms/security/advisories/GHSA-7gww-x7fh-jf9j>
- <https://github.com/librenms/librenms>
- <https://github.com/librenms/librenms/releases/tag/26.7.0>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-7gww-x7fh-jf9j>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-7gww-x7fh-jf9j/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.