# Gogs's password-reset tokens use account-activation lifetime, ignoring RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES Advisory record · `GHSA-5c3f-6486-3g7g` - **Identifiers:** `GHSA-5c3f-6486-3g7g` · `CVE-2026-52809` · `GO-2026-5140` - **State:** Confirmed - **Severity:** CVSS 6.8 Medium - **Critical:** No - **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-324](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/324.html) · [CWE-613](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/613.html) - **Tags:** [Authentication bypass](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/auth-bypass.md) · [CWE-324](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/cwe-324.md) - **Published:** 23 Jun 2026 - **Updated:** 21 Jul 2026 - **Reviewed by a person:** No Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 23 Jun 2026, 17:03 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known. ## Affected packages - `gogs.io/gogs` (Go): affected `<0.14.3`; fixed in `0.14.3` ## Machine-written summary Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person. > Gogs versions before 0.14.3 generate password-reset tokens using the account-activation lifetime, so the admin setting RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES is ignored and reset tokens stay valid for the longer activation window. An attacker who has intercepted a victim's reset email (for example from a shared inbox) and who can reach the reset endpoint can set a new password and take over the account, though the source notes this requires the shorter reset setting to be in use. Upgrade to Gogs 0.14.3 or later. Written 6 Nov 2026. ## Not analysed yet We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check. ## Severity and exploitation - 6.8 Medium, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M) - **CISA KEV:** Not listed. - **EPSS:** 0.0019, the 8th percentile, on 6 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. ## Timeline - 24 Jun 2026, 20:29 UTC: [Confirmed by the CVE List](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-52809) - 24 Jun 2026, 21:16 UTC: [Confirmed by NVD](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52809) - 31 Oct 2026, 15:05 UTC: First seen by agentprime - 31 Oct 2026, 15:05 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5c3f-6486-3g7g) ## Sources - [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-5c3f-6486-3g7g](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5c3f-6486-3g7g) - [OSV: GHSA-5c3f-6486-3g7g](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5c3f-6486-3g7g) - - - - - - Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code. ## Check whether this affects you A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet. - With the agentprime MCP server (), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: - In a browser: reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it. - Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, - As JSON: , or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages () --- The web page: . Everything for agents: .