# Nginx UI: Casdoor SSO callback uses a constant \`state\` parameter (login CSRF)

Advisory record · `GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78` · `CVE-2026-84312` · `GO-2026-6773`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 7.1 High
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-287](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html) · [CWE-352](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/352.html)
- **Tags:** [Authentication bypass](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/auth-bypass.md) · [Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/csrf.md)
- **Published:** 15 Oct 2026
- **Updated:** 28 Oct 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 15 Oct 2026, 20:12 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI` (Go): affected `<1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0`; fixed in `1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Nginx UI (github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI) is vulnerable through the Casdoor SSO login flow, where the OAuth state parameter is a fixed value rather than a per-login random value, and the callback does not check it. An attacker who gets a victim's browser to submit the attacker's own authorization code can log the victim in as the attacker, so the victim's later configuration changes are visible to the attacker. Upgrade to 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 or later. Until patched, disable Casdoor SSO.

Written 1 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 7.1 High, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0017, the 6th percentile, on 5 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:11 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:11 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78)
- [OSV: GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78)
- <https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84312>
- <https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/23d1934099b05b2a01589b48129dc3d3159d91c2>
- <https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui>
- <https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.4.1>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.