# Arbitrary file read via workspace confinement bypass in local-operator /v1/chat/agents/{id}/edit

Advisory record · `GHSA-3xjw-9qpc-53mh`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-3xjw-9qpc-53mh` · `PYSEC-2026-4010`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 7.5 High
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-22](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html) · [CWE-200](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html)
- **Tags:** [Path traversal](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/path-traversal.md) · [Information disclosure](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/info-disclosure.md)
- **Published:** 5 Sept 2026
- **Updated:** 30 Sept 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 5 Sept 2026, 07:44 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `local-operator` (PyPI): affected `<29fc4c68a3ed1d238b8abf6b6a6136a3361416a5 || <0.47.5`; fixed in `29fc4c68a3ed1d238b8abf6b6a6136a3361416a5`, `0.47.5`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Local-operator versions before 0.47.5 let the /v1/chat/agents/{agent_id}/edit endpoint read any file the server process can access, because the caller-supplied file_path is not checked against the agent's workspace. An unauthenticated client with network access to the API can exploit this with absolute or traversal paths, and the file contents are sent to the model and returned in the response. Upgrade local-operator to 0.47.5 or later, which confines server-side reads to the agent's workspace and binds lop serve to 127.0.0.1 by default.

Written 1 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 7.5 High, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`, from OSV

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** No score.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 14:09 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:09 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/PYSEC-2026-4010)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-3xjw-9qpc-53mh](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3xjw-9qpc-53mh)
- [OSV: GHSA-3xjw-9qpc-53mh](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-3xjw-9qpc-53mh)
- <https://github.com/damianvtran/local-operator/security/advisories/GHSA-3xjw-9qpc-53mh>
- <https://github.com/damianvtran/local-operator/pull/643>
- <https://github.com/damianvtran/local-operator/commit/29fc4c68a3ed1d238b8abf6b6a6136a3361416a5>
- <https://github.com/damianvtran/local-operator/releases/tag/v0.47.5>
- <https://pypi.org/project/local-operator/>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-3xjw-9qpc-53mh>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-3xjw-9qpc-53mh/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.