# In Apache Spark versions prior to 3.4.0, applications using spark-submit can specify a 'proxy-user' to run as, limiting privileges. The application can execute code with the privileges of the submi...

Advisory record · `GHSA-329j-jfvr-rhr6`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-329j-jfvr-rhr6` · `BIT-spark-2023-22946` · `CVE-2023-22946` · `PYSEC-2023-44`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 6.4 Medium
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-269](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/269.html)
- **Tags:** [Privilege escalation](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/privilege-escalation.md)
- **Published:** 17 Apr 2023
- **Updated:** 10 Jun 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 17 Apr 2023, 08:15 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `pyspark` (PyPI): affected `<3.4.0`; fixed in `3.4.0`

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> Apache Spark (pyspark on PyPI) versions prior to 3.4.0 are vulnerable. An application submitted with spark-submit and a proxy-user setting can run code with the privileges of the submitting user by supplying malicious configuration-related classes on the classpath, which affects deployments relying on proxy-user, such as those using Apache Livy. Upgrade to pyspark 3.4.0 or later, and keep spark.submit.proxyUser.allowCustomClasspathInClusterMode at its default of "false" so submitted applications cannot override it.

Written 8 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 6.4 Medium, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N`, from CNA (apache)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.011, the 66th percentile, on 17 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 31 Oct 2026, 15:13 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 15:13 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-329j-jfvr-rhr6)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-329j-jfvr-rhr6](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-329j-jfvr-rhr6)
- [OSV: GHSA-329j-jfvr-rhr6](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-329j-jfvr-rhr6)
- <https://lists.apache.org/thread/yllfl25xh5tbotjmg93zrq4bzwhqc0gv>
- <https://lists.apache.org/thread/yllfl25xh5tbotjmg93zrq4bzwhqc0gv>
- <https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-329j-jfvr-rhr6>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-329j-jfvr-rhr6>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-329j-jfvr-rhr6/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.
