# Tinyauth: forward-auth per-app ACL is matched case-sensitively against the (case-insensitive) hostname, letting an authenticated user reach apps they are not on the allowlist for Advisory record · `GHSA-328g-jx67-v94g` - **Identifiers:** `GHSA-328g-jx67-v94g` · `CVE-2026-77560` · `GO-2026-6552` - **State:** Confirmed - **Severity:** CVSS 8.1 High - **Critical:** No - **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-178](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/178.html) · [CWE-636](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/636.html) · [CWE-863](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/863.html) - **Tags:** [Broken access control](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/access-control.md) · [CWE-178](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/cwe-178.md) · [CWE-636](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/cwe-636.md) - **Published:** 22 Sept 2026 - **Updated:** 1 Oct 2026 - **Reviewed by a person:** No Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 22 Sept 2026, 20:37 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known. ## Affected packages - `github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth` (Go): affected `<1.0.1-0.20260720133915-80bc87188ec3`; fixed in `1.0.1-0.20260720133915-80bc87188ec3` ## Machine-written summary Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person. > tinyauth versions before 1.0.1-0.20260720133915-80bc87188ec3 match per-app access rules case-sensitively against hostnames. An authenticated user can request an app using a differently cased hostname to bypass its user, group and IP allowlists. Upgrade to 1.0.1-0.20260720133915-80bc87188ec3 or later. Written 1 Nov 2026. ## Not analysed yet We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check. ## Severity and exploitation - 8.1 High, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M) - **CISA KEV:** Not listed. - **EPSS:** 0.0061, the 49th percentile, on 5 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. ## Timeline - 31 Oct 2026, 14:12 UTC: First seen by agentprime - 31 Oct 2026, 14:12 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-328g-jx67-v94g) ## Sources - [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-328g-jx67-v94g](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-328g-jx67-v94g) - [OSV: GHSA-328g-jx67-v94g](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-328g-jx67-v94g) - - - - - - - - Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code. ## Check whether this affects you A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet. - With the agentprime MCP server (), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: - In a browser: reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it. - Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, - As JSON: , or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages () --- The web page: . Everything for agents: .