# Gotenberg's DNS rebinding bypasses SSRF validation on Chromium URL conversion routes

Advisory record · `GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3`

- **Identifiers:** `GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3` · `CVE-2026-42592` · `GO-2026-4990`
- **State:** Confirmed
- **Severity:** CVSS 5.3 Medium
- **Critical:** No
- **Weakness (CWE):** [CWE-367](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html) · [CWE-918](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html)
- **Tags:** [Race condition](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/race-condition.md) · [Server-side request forgery (SSRF)](https://agentprime.io/advisories/tag/ssrf.md)
- **Published:** 7 May 2026
- **Updated:** 10 Sept 2026
- **Reviewed by a person:** No

Published by the GitHub Advisory Database at 7 May 2026, 00:57 UTC. agentprime has not analysed this yet, so whether it affects any app is not known.

## Affected packages

- `github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8` (Go): affected `<=8.31.0`; no fixed version yet

## Machine-written summary

Summary written by Claude Haiku from the source advisory. Not reviewed by a person.

> GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3: Gotenberg (github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8) versions up to and including 8.31.0 are affected. The Chromium URL conversion routes check a URL against the private-address deny-list, but a DNS rebinding attack can return a public IP to that check and a private IP to Chromium's later connection. An unauthenticated caller who controls DNS for a hostname can reach services on the container's loopback interface or other private addresses, such as cloud metadata endpoints, and read the response in the generated PDF. No fix is listed.

Written 1 Nov 2026.

## Not analysed yet

We haven’t published our analysis of this Advisory yet. Once a person has reviewed it, this page will say what’s vulnerable, what has to be true for your app to be affected, and how to check.

## Severity and exploitation

- 5.3 Medium, CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`, from CNA (GitHub_M)

- **CISA KEV:** Not listed.
- **EPSS:** 0.0019, the 8th percentile, on 14 Nov 2026: FIRST’s estimate of the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

## Timeline

- 14 May 2026, 16:16 UTC: [Confirmed by NVD](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42592)
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:13 UTC: First seen by agentprime
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:13 UTC: [Confirmed by OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3)

## Sources

- [GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3)
- [OSV: GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3)
- <https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42592>
- <https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg>

Facts on this page come from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), OSV and the other sources listed, as published. We don’t reproduce full advisory descriptions, which can contain exploit code.

## Check whether this affects you

A Match means an installed version is in the affected range above. Most don’t affect the app; agentprime hasn’t analysed this one yet.

- With the agentprime MCP server (<https://api.agentprime.io/mcp>), ask your agent to check the project: `check_lockfile` sends a lockfile, `check_packages` a list of installed packages, and both return the Matches and the upgrades that clear them. `get_advisory` returns this record. Setup: <https://agentprime.io/mcp.md>
- In a browser: <https://agentprime.io/check/> reads your lockfile in the browser, never uploading it.
- Whether it touches your code, with file and line: the Claude Code plugin, <https://agentprime.io/plugin.md>
- As JSON: <https://api.agentprime.io/v1/advisories/GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3>, or `POST https://api.agentprime.io/v1/match` with your packages (<https://agentprime.io/api.md>)

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The web page: <https://agentprime.io/advisories/GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3/>. Everything for agents: <https://agentprime.io/llms.txt>.